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Perceived Risks Versus Actual Risks:
Managing Hazards Through Negotiation
Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette*
Introduction
Until recently, the study of risk behavior - what some have called
"motivated irrationality" - has suffered from the lack of attention of
any single group of researchers. Brain scientists at the National Institute
of Mental Health recently sought to remedy this deficiency. They gave
evidence that those who voluntarily increase their individual (not
societal) risk, like rock climbers and hang gliders, for example, have
lower levels of the brain enzyme monoamine oxidase. They also have
lower levels of a brain chemical called DBH, and higher levels of
gonadal hormone. 1
One problem with attributing risk taking simply to biochemical
factors, however, is that many people delight in taking certain kinds of
risks but detest others. American visitors to China, for example, are
appalled at the high percentage of Chinese men who smoke, while most
Chinese are surprised at Americans' chronic over-consumption of
alcohol, especially when it is associated with one-half of all fatal
automobile accidents and many types of violence. 2 How do we
* Professor Shrader-Frechette received her B.S. in physics from Xavier University
and her Ph.D. from Notre Dame University. She is Graduate Research Professor of
Philosophy, University of South Florida and Editor-in-Chief for the monograph
series, ENVIRONMENTAL EnTCS AND Sc ENcE Poucy.
1 Weiss, How Dare We? Scientists Seek the Sources of Risk-Taking Behavior,
132 Sc. NEws 58 (1987).
2 Id. at 59.
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explain such phenomena? Perhaps everyone employs subjective criteria
for rational risk behavior. Or, perhaps the criteria are not subjective, but
so complex that they are impossible to formulate.
At least one fact about responses to societal risk is certain: they are
highly value laden. One highly evaluative response to societal risk is
made by experts who subscribe to (what I call) the '"xpert-Judgment
Strategy".
The Expert-Judgment Strategy
Assessors who subscribe to the "Expert-Judgment Strategy" assume
that one can always make a legitimate distinction between "actual risk"
calculated by experts and so-called "perceived risk" postulated by
laypersons.3 They assume that experts grasp real, not perceived, risk,
but that the public is able only to know perceived risk. This essay
argues that all risk is perceived, even though there are criteria for
showing why some risk perceptions are more objective or better than
others. It argues that, although risk is not wholly relative, it is
unavoidably "perceived." After showing what is wrong with the Expert-
Judgment Strategy and the ethical consequences following from its use,
the essay argues for an alternative approach to hazard evaluation and
risk management. It describes a new, negotiated (rather than merely
expert-based) account of rational risk management.
To understand more precisely what is meant by the Expert-Judgment
Strategy, recall that one of the most fundamental sources of divergence,
3 Many risk assessors employ this strategy, e.g., Cohen, Hafele, Okrent,
Whipple, Jones-Lee, Rothschild and Morgan. See, e.g., Whipple, Nonpessimistic
Risk Assessment in THE RISK ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND HUMAN
HEALTH HAZARDS, supra note 3, at 1112 (D. Paustenbach ed. 1989). See also
Cohen, Risk Analyses of Buried Wastes in THE RISK ASSESSMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL AND HUMAN HEALTH HAZARDS, supra. at 575. Some scholars, like
Wildavsky and Douglas, also assume that, because risk is perceived, it is relative.
See A. WILDAVSKY & M. DOUGLAS, RISK AND CULTURE (1982). For arguments
against their view, see section 3 of this essay.
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in technology-related risk assessments, is whether evaluation of specific
hazards is in part a function of a real, probabilistically described risk, or
whether hazard evaluation is wholly a product of the societal processes
by which information concerning the danger is exchanged. More
succinctly put, do people fear nuclear power, for example, because they
assume that it is an inherently dangerous technology? Or do they fear
atomic energy because they are victims of a sensational media campaign
that has played on ignorance and paranoia about technology? 4
The Expert-Judgment Strategy consists of the belief, either that risk
can be reduced to some characteristic of a technology, determined only
by experts, or that it is possible for experts alone to distinguish "actual
risk," as a property of a technology, from so-called "perceived risk"
postulated by laypersons. Once they make the distinction between
perceived risk/real risk, many assessors assume that the perceived risks
of laypeople are the source of most controversy over technology. 5 As
a consequence, they ask how to mitigate the impact of perceptions
about risk (perceptions they assume to be erroneous), rather than how to
mitigate the impact of risk itself. They assume that public relations, or
"risk communication," is their only problem.6
4 E. LIEBow & J. FAWCETr, SocIoEcoNoMIc ASPECTS OF REPOSiTORY-RLATED
RISK PERCEPTIONS: A PRELIMINARY LTERATURE REVIEw 4, 6 (Battelle Human
Affairs Research Center, July 16, 1987); See also Short, The Social Fabric at
Risk: Toward the Social Transformation of Risk-Analysis, 49 AM. Soc. REV. 711
(1984). C. PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH-RISK TECHNOLOGIES
(1984).
5 See supra note 3.
6 See, e.g., Whipple, supra note 3, at 1113; Liebow, Letter to Kristin
Shrader-Frechette, (Batelle Human Affairs Research Center [hereinafter Batelle],
July 17, 1987); Liebow & Fawcett, supra note 4, at 4, 6; E. LIEBOW & D.
HERBORN, ASSESSING THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL EFFECTS OF PERCEIVING THE
REPOSITORY AS "RISKY": A PRELIMINARY APPROACH, (Batelle, May 28, 1987). On
August 6, 1987, Batelle researchers assembled experts from all over the U.S. to
discuss the problems associated with mitigating the impacts of risk perceptions; see
PACIFIC NoRnwEr LABORATORY, PNL 6515, ASSESSING SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
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The Expert-Judgment Strategy can also occur when assessors
presuppose that a technological risk is defined purely in terms of
physical impacts. For example, if researchers speak of the "social
amplification of risk" as a process whereby hazards produce social
impacts (e.g., fear) that exceed their health and safety effects, 7 then
they appear to presuppose that the risk itself is purely physical and
measurable by experts. On the contrary, however, it is arguable that
social impacts (such as a decrease in civil liberties or uncertainties
associated with the availability of adequate compensation, should a
hazard occur) are part of the risk itself.
Some researchers who fall victim to the Expert-Judgment Strategy
also speak, for example, of "perception-caused impacts" and of
"perception-induced adverse impacts."8 But there are no adverse
impacts that are purely perception-induced unless one has completely
uncontroversial measures of hazards (versus perceptions of hazards)
and uncontroversial measures of risk impacts (versus impacts of risk
perceptions). We have wholly exact measures for neither. What we
have, instead, is a quantitative, "expert" definition of risk, as opposed
to a qualitative, allegedly subjective notion of lay risk perception.
Those who fall victim to the Expert-Judgment Strategy typically assume
that risk can be defined purely probabilistically, as an average annual
probability of fatality. They likewise assume that anyone (e.g., a
layperson concerned about consent, equity, etc.) who does not
subscribe to this purely probabilistic definition has an erroneous risk
EFFECrS OF PERCEIVED RISK (M. Nealey & E. Liebow eds. 1988).
7 See R. Kasperson, Emel et al., Radioactive Wastes and the Social
Amplification of Risk, in WASTE MANAGEMENT '87: PROCEEDINGS OF THE
SYMPOSIUM ON WASIE MANAGEMENT held Mar. 4, 1987 at Tucson, AZ 2 (available
from Batelle); Liebow & Fawcett, supra note 4, at 4; Liebow & Herborn, supra
note 6, at 3.
8 Liebow, supra note 6, at 1; Liebow & Fawcett, supra note 4, at 1. For an
excellent discussion of the risk perceptions of the public, see B. WYNNE, RISK
MANAGEMEmAND HAZARDOUS WAsrE 10 (1987).
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perception, rather than an accurate, alternative conception of risk.
It will not do to stipulatively define one type of risk (that of
laypeople) merely as a misperception of another type of risk (that of
experts), however, unless one has evidence for the claim that the latter is
the correct definition. And the latter is a plausible candidate for a correct
definition only if we can distinguish precisely and completely between
the risks and perceptions of them. In subsequent paragraphs, I shall
argue that, although some risk perceptions are more accurate or
objective than others, it is impossible to distinguish between risks and
risk perceptions, and hence not reasonable to subscribe to the Expert-
Judgment Strategy.
All Risks are Perceived, Although they are not Wholly
Relative
One can distinguish between risks and risk perceptions only if she
is able to establish that a perception about a risk (and not the risk itself)
caused a particular impact. Yet this is virtually impossible to do, for a
number of reasons. For one thing, behavior has multiple causes, and
sometimes neither a researcher nor the actor knows what those causes
are. It is not enough to establish correlations between particular impacts,
e.g., aversion to a particular danger, and specific risk perceptions. This
would not show that the perceptions caused the alleged effects. Some
other factor, perhaps a valuational one, could have caused the impacts.
For example, there might be a correlation between catastrophic risks and
the impact of high risk aversion. Yet this correlation might be accidental.
Instead it might be the case that all catastrophic risks are also
involuntarily imposed, and hence that the real cause of high risk
aversion is the lack of control over it, not its catastrophic nature. If so,
then it may be difficult to distinguish between impacts of risks and
impacts of risk perceptions.
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To understand why this distinction is problematic, consider another
example. Suppose a person becomes an antinuclear activist, on the
grounds that he is unwilling to take the chance that a commercial reactor
accident will occur. Suppose also that he is reluctant to take this chance,
because nuclear liability is limited to approximately one percent of the
total possible losses, in the event of a catastrophe. The problematic
question raised by this case is whether the impact, the person's
activism, is caused by the real risk, e.g., the risk of not being
compensated fully, or whether the impact, the activism, is caused by the
perceived risk, e.g., the perception that, since the chances of accident
are not small, the risk of noncompensation is not small.
If one argues that the risk causes the activism, then to mitigate this
impact, the threat of noncompensation ought to be removed and the
Price-Anderson Act (which limits nuclear liability) ought to be repealed.
If one argues that erroneous risk perceptions (that noncompensation is
likely) cause the activism, since a catastrophic accident is also probable,
then mitigating the impact requires removing these allegedly erroneous
perceptions. But one can remove the perceptions that noncompensation
is likely only by guaranteeing full compensation should an accident
occur. And one can guarantee full compensation only by repealing the
Price-Anderson Act. Hence, whether risk or risk perception causes an
impact, viz., lay aversion/activism, strategies for mitigating the impact
are often the same. But this case suggests that it is often difficult to
determine: (1) whether risks or risk perceptions cause a particular
impact; (2) whether one can distinguish between strategies for
mitigating impacts of risks, as opposed to impacts of risk perceptions;
and therefore (3) whether one can distinguish impacts of risks from
impacts of perceived risks. These difficulties raise the question of
whether there may be another way to differentiate hazards from
perception of them. There are at least eight reasons that suggest it may
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be impossible to differentiate risks from risk perceptions.
Before going into these eight reasons, it is important to emphasize
that our inability to distinguish risks from risk perceptions does not
force us into a position of cultural relativism. Even though all risks are
perceived, many of them are also real. An analogy will illustrate this
point. Death is real and death is certain. The risk of death, however,
although equally real, is not certain, since it is in part a probability, and
such probabilities can rarely be known with certainty. The risk of death
is purely perceived, theoretical, or estimated until death becomes a
certainty. Indeed the occurrence of death, in a particular case, reveals
how accurate our perceptions or estimates of the risk of death were. But
if this reasoning is correct, then (more generally) although all risks of
some event, X, occurring are real, the exact degree and nature of these
risks are not, in principle, confirmable until X actually occurs. Prior to
this occurrence, risk perceptions can be judged as more or less accurate,
only on the basis of nonempirical and theoretical criteria like explanatory
power, simplicity, internal coherence, etc. Nevertheless, risk
perceptions are often real and objective, at least in the sense that
empirical evidence, e.g., accident frequency, is relevant to them and is
capable of providing grounds for amending them. This means that all
risks (the probability p that some X will occur) are both perceived and
real. Their exact nature and magnitude become more fully knowable,
however, insofar as more instances of X occur. Douglas and Wildavsky
erred in believing that, because all risks are perceived, therefore all
risks are relative.9 Their inference would hold, however, only if
there were no ways to assess perceptions of risk. Since there are ways,
perceived risks are not wholly relative. Risk perceptions can be assessed
on the basis of rational criticism, in terms of their conformity with
empirically observed frequencies/probabilities, and on the basis of their
9 WILDAVSKY & DOUGLAS, supra note 3.
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predictive and explanatory power.
Now that we have sketched at least a partial basis for showing how
one might argue that this account is not completely relativistic, let's
examine at least eight reasons why actual risk is not typically
distinguishable from perceived risk.
First, risk probabilities often do not reflect risk frequencies. This
is in part because there are numerous difficulties of hazard estimation
that do not admit of analytical, probabilistic resolution by experts. Often
the risk problem is not well enough understood to allow accurate
predictions, as the use of techniques like fault-tree analysis shows.
Hence experts are forced to rely on subjective or perceived risk
probabilities, instead of on actual empirical accident frequencies
established over a long trial period. Even if assessors based their
notions of probability on actual, empirical, accident frequency, this
move would not always deliver their estimates of risk from the charge of
being "perceived." Since there are reliable frequencies only for events
that have had a long recorded history, use of historical accident/hazard
data for new technologies likely results in an underestimating of the
danger;, this is because certain events may not have occurred between the
inception of a technology and the end of the period for which the risk
information is compiled. Moreover, low accident frequency does not
prove low accident probability. Only when the period of observing
accident frequency approaches infinity would the two, frequency and
probability, converge.
A second reason why one cannot distinguish actual from perceived
risk, in any wholly accurate way, is that actual risk estimates are always
very rough and imprecise. The estimates typically vary from two to six
orders of magnitude. Such imprecision is unavoidable, whether the
estimates are based on probabilistic calculations or on actual experience.
On the one hand, if they are based on probabilities, then assessors are
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forced to employ a number of value-laden theoretical assumptions and
mathematical models. On the other hand, if the risk estimates are based
on actual experience, or accident frequency, they are likewise
"perceived" because probability does not equal frequency, as has
already been mentioned, except for an infinite number of trials.
Moreover, even actual frequencies do not provide a precise measure of a
particular risk, because this number is always formulated as an average
of a given group of frequencies, and such averages, by definition, do
not take particular (and perhaps relevant, or site-specific) deviations into
account.
Third, some of the most important aspects of hazards, whether real
or perceived, are not amenable to quantification. What experts call
"actual" risk estimates are based on the presupposition that risk is
measured by probability and consequences, and that both can be
quantified. Yet most laypeople would probably claim that what makes a
thing most hazardous are factors that are not susceptible to
quantification, factors such as a risk being imposed without consent, or
being unknown, or posing a threat to civil liberties or to constitutional
guarantees of due process. 10
Fourth, whether it is perceived or (allegedly) actual, risk is a
theoretical concept, not something capable of precise empirical
prediction or confirmation. If it were empirically confirmed/determined,
the hazard would be certain, not just a risk. In general, "risk" is defined
in terms of expected utility theory and hence is a theoretical concept
carrying with it all the baggage of this specific decision theory. In
particular applications, "risk" is always defined on the basis of a whole
10 See VALUES AT RISK (D. MacLean ed. 1986). See also K. SHRADER-
FREcHETTE, RisK ANALYSIS AND ScmNTIc METHOD 176 (1985). Finally, see
Andrews, Environmental Impact Assessment and Risk Assessment in
ENVmRaMETAL IMPACt ASSESSMENT 85 (P. Wathern ed. 1988); and Cox & Ricci,
Legal and Philosophical Aspects of Risk Analysis in THE RISK ASSESSMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL AND HUMAN HEALTH HAZARDS, supra note 3, at 1017.
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host of theoretical assumptions, many of which are often controversial.
For example, a number of incompatible "cancer models" (dose-response
models), each with attendant assumptions, has been used to estimate the
incidence of tumors in populations exposed to formaldehyde. In 1987,
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) called formaldehyde a
"probable human carcinogen". The EPA said that those exposed to
formaldehyde treated pressed wood could face a cancer risk, over 10
years, of 2 in 10,000. Experts at the Harvard School of Public Health,
however, criticized the EPA risk assessment as premature and said the
true formaldehyde risk was uncertain. Other expert groups, however,
including scientists at the American Cancer Society and the Consumer
Product Safety Commission, argued that the EPA models were
incorrect, but in the opposite direction. They said EPA findings
underestimated the cancer risk.1 1
The formaldehyde case, as well as those of EDB, dioxin, and
methylene chloride, all illustrate that, even as late as the 1980's,
particular accounts of risk are highly controversial and theory-laden. But
if all risk is known in terms of the categories of a particular scientific or
modeling theory, then there is no actual hazard, apart from some
particular theoretical account of it. Hence there is no uncontroversial
way to distinguish "actual" from "perceived" risk.
Fifth, because risk perceptions often affect risk probabilities, and
vice versa, it is frequently impossible to distinguish hazards from
perceptions of them. This fact is well known to social scientists as part
of the account known as the "self-fulfilling prophecy." For example, if I
11 For discussion of the formaldehyde case, see Ricci & Henderson, Fear, Fiat and
Fiasco in PHE OTPC VARIATION IN POPULATIONS 288 (A. Woodhead, M. Bender &
R. Leonard eds. 1988). See also Paustenbach, A Survey of Health Risk
Assessment in THE RISK ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND HUMAN HEALTH
HAZARDS, supra note 3, at 38, and Gammage & Travis, Formaldehyde Exposure
and Risk in THE RISK ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND HUMAN HEALTH
HAZARDS, at 601.
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perceive my chances of getting cancer to be high, then my perceptions
can exacerbate stress and therefore increase the probability that actually
do become a cancer victim. Hence there is often no clear distinction
between actual and perceived risk.
Sixth, there are a number of reasons for arguing that the distinction
between actual and perceived risk cannot be based on the alleged
objectivity of expert estimates, as opposed to the alleged subjectivity
of lay risk estimates. Admittedly, laypersons typically overestimate the
severity of many technological hazards. However, even if it could be
established that the public exaggerates the accident probabilities
associated with some technology, e.g., liquified natural gas (LNG), this
fact alone would be a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for
establishing the thesis that laypersons erroneously overestimate the
severity of the LNG risk. Their risk perceptions could only be said to be
erroneously high if they were based solely on incorrect accident
probabilities. This is because, even though laypersons' perceived
probabilities may be erroneous, they may not completely explain or
determine their risk aversion. The public might view risks as high, not
only because their accident probabilities are of a certain level, but also
because their consequences are potentially catastrophic.
Moreover, apart from whether probabilities alone explain or dictate
risk judgments, there is reason to believe that, at least in some areas,
expert estimates of probabilities are not necessarily superior to those of
laypeople. In their classic studies of the heuristic judgmental strategies
that often lead to error in probability estimates, Kahneman, Tversky,
and Oskamp concluded that experts were just as prone as laypeople to
judgmental error regarding probabilities whenever they had merely
statistical data. 12
12 Tversky & Kahneman, Belief in the Law of Small Numbers in JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAnqTY: HEuRimTics AND BIASES 23 (D. Kahneman, P. Slovic & A.
Tversky eds. 1982); Kahneman & Tversky, Subjective Probability in JUDGMENT
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Another common judgmental error of mathematically trained
professionals is overconfidence; this occurs because experts' trust in
their probability estimates is typically a function of how much
information they have gathered, rather than a function of its accuracy or
its predictive success. Since everyone, even those highly trained in
probability and statistics, must make simplifying assumptions in
estimating probabilities, and since experts are just as prone as laypeople
to these judgmental errors, there is little reason to believe that experts are
always able to calculate actual or real risk, while laypeople are merely
able only to construct perceived or subjective risk.13
Seventh, those who attempt to distinguish "actual risk" and
"perceived risk", are wrong to assume that the latter is merely an
erroneous understanding of the former. 14 They are wrong because
there is no universal definition of risk underlying the two concepts. For
one thing, experts disagree as to whether (and when) to employ
concepts such as "individual risk," "relative risk," "population risk,"
and "absolute risk".15 Moreover, as was already suggested, the term
'risk' in "actual risk" and "perceived risk" has neither the same referent
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra, at 46. See also note 9,
supra.
13 See note 11, supra. See also Oskamp, Overconfidence in Case-Study
Judgments in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra, at
287.
14 See Whipple, supra note 3, at 1112 and Cohen, supra note 3, at 575.
15 For various definitions of risk, see, e.g., Cox, Comparative Risk Measures in
PMEOTYPIC VARIATION IN POPULATIONS 233 (A. Woodhead, M. Bender & R.
Leonard eds. 1988). For discussion of "relative risk," for example, see Ames,
Magaw & Gold, Ranking Possible Carcinogens in THE RISK ASSESSMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL AND HUMAN HEALTH TAZAPD. supra note 3, at 1083, Layard &
Silvers, Epidemiology in Environmental Risk Assessment in THE RISK
ASSESSMENT OF ENIRMONMENTAL AND HUMAN HEALTH HAZARDS, at 159; Harley,
Environmental Lung Cancer Risk from Radon Daughter Exposure in THE RISK
ASSESSMENTOF ENVIRONMENTAL AND HUMAN HEALTH HAZARDS, at 620; and Cohen,
supra note 3, at 574.
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nor the same meaning. What Hafele, Okrent, Jones-Lee, Morgan, and
others call "actual risk" is the probability of a particular hazard
occurring, times the magnitude of its consequences. Typically this is
expressed as an average annual probability of fatality, where fatality is
the consequence associated with a particular risk. What they call
"perceived risk," alleging that it is an incorrect view of actual risk,
however, is not merely (an incorrect) perception of probability times
consequences. Rather, most laypeople would claim that what typical
risk assessors call "perceived risk" includes more than mere
probability. Hence when laypeople say that something is a "high risk,"
they do not necessarily mean only that it has a high probability of
causing death. And if so, then "actual risk" is not mere probability times
fatality, and "perceived risks" are not merely perceptions of probability
times fatality.
Eighth, there is no distinction between perceived risks and actual
risks because there are no risks except perceived risks. If there were
hazards that were not perceived, then we would not know them.
Because we know them, in some sense, proves that even real risks are
perceived, even real risks must be known via categories and
perceptions. This is related to the earlier point that all risks are, in part,
theoretical constructs, not completely empirical, not wholly capable of
confirmation. All risks are defined, filtered, and judged on the basis of
some subjective standard, whether it is expected utility theory or
benefit-cost analysis, or something else. No notion of what is hazardous
is without theoretical baggage, and if not, then all risks are perceived.
Apart from these eight reasons for rejecting the distinction between
actual and perceived risk, it is important to point out that acceptance of a
sharp distinction between real risk, as probability times accident
consequences, and perceived risk, as an incorrect view of probability
times consequences, leads to at least two undesirable consequences.
One negative effect is that the distinction misidentifies the source of
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divergence in risk judgments and misattributes this disagreement to
accurate, versus inaccurate, knowledge of probability times accident
consequences. Hence it provides policy makers with little insight on
controversy over hazards, little basis for investigating the important
ethical, methodological, and evaluative reasons for divergent risk
judgments.
Moreover, if policy makers assume that there is an unbridgeable gap
between lay/perceived and expert/real risk, then there is less reason for
them to take account of lay views, since error could be said to have no
rights. Hence the Expert-Judgment Strategy could lead to
disenfranchising democratic decision makers.
But if accepting a sharp distinction between risk and risk perception
is both politically dangerous and epistemologically confused, then what
follows? It makes no sense to talk about risks versus perceived risks, as
if experts had some magic window on reality. Instead we must deal with
all hazards as they are perceived, even though (as was just argued) they
are not purely relative. We must focus on disputes over risk perceptions
and attempt to ameliorate them and the controversy surrounding them.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Versus the
Utilities
But if we ought to deal with all risks as risk perceptions, and not
assume that experts alone somehow have access to real or unperceived
risks, then we might rely on what Liebow and Herborn call an
"institutional memory," in order to learn how to use past conflicts as a
basis for resolving current risk controversies. 16 One case is particularly
instructive in this regard. It has been the nation's most celebrated,
lengthiest, and perhaps most costly environmental controversy.
The conflict began in 1964 and was between the EPA and five New
16 Liebow & Herborn, supra note 6, at 4.
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York utility companies. The controversy focused on the potential
environmental impacts of Con Ed's proposed Cornwell Project, a
pumped-storage facility to be built on a mountain overlooking the
Hudson valley. At the focus of the debate was the impact of the
facility's water withdrawals on the Hudson River striped bass
population. As several authors in BIOSCIENCE put it:17
[Tihe Hudson River controversy was a unique test of the
ability of biologists to use their science to aid public decision
makers in achieving an equitable solution to an important
environmental problem.... After more than a decade of study
and the expenditure of tens of millions of dollars, it was still
not possible to draw definitive conclusions about the long-
term effects of entrainment and impingement on fish
populations in the Hudson River. We do not believe that this
failure can be blamed on lack of effort, on the incompetence
of the biologists involved, or on the use of the wrong model.
We believe that it occurred because of insufficient
understanding of underlying biological processes [even
though,]... in the Hudson River controversy, the scientific
issues were more clearly defined, and the research effort
greater, than for any other major environmental dispute
known to us.
The settlement of the Hudson River case, negotiated between the
EPA and the five companies, called for the utilities to deviate from the
outage schedule, provided that the overall degree of mitigation of
impacts was not reduced. The credit allowed for shutting down a
specific generating unit during a given week was determined by the
contribution of that unit to the conditional entrainment mortality rate for
striped bass.
What scholars learned (from tens of millions of dollars of research
spent on biological processes that were impossible to define in the
Hudson-River case) is that sometimes science, even science regarding
17 Barnthouse et al., Population Biology in the Courtroom: the Hudson River
Controversy, 34 BIoSCL 17 ( 1984).
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risk perception and behavior, is often at an impasse. In the Hudson-
River case, a resolution was reached only after all affected parties
decided not to try to define particular impacts and ascertain their causes.
Likewise, in the risk perception case, I suspect that a resolution of
controversy will occur only after people stop trying to distinguish
perceived risk from real risk. Aristotle astutely noted that the wise
person recognizes the degree of certainty appropriate to particular types
of inquiries, and that she does not seek a level of certainty inappropriate
to the specific kind of investigation.
If Aristotle's insight is applicable to the question of hazard
evaluation and management, then perhaps assessors ought to stop the
interminable haggling over which persons are correct in their risk
judgments, the experts or the public. Instead, perhaps we and they, the
experts, ought to shift our focus, in part, from the scientific to the
ethical dimension. We ought to attempt to formulate a procedural or
negotiated solution as a means of solving the problem of defining,
evaluating, and managing risks.
Negotiating Risk Solutions: Arguments for Consent and
Compensation
If an appropriate risk-evaluation strategy is to have persons negotiate
about their alternative definitions of risk and their different value
judgments concerning hazards, rather than to have them simply assess
the predictive or explanatory power of their risk evaluations, or merely
follow the Expert-Judgment Strategy, then there is an obvious question.
How does one negotiate among persons so as to resolve some of their
conflicts about acceptable risk? E. Peelle, sociologist at Oak Ridge
Laboratories, has argued that creating a citizens' task force to specify
mitigation, compensation, and incentive measures for hazardous
technologies could help resolve controversies over risk. In Tennessee,
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for example, such task forces have already succeeded. The "net local
balance" of the Department of Energy's proposal to site a Monitored
Retrievable Storage facility in the state changed from negative to positive
after a citizens' task force was organized. 18
What the Tennessee experience suggests is that there are both
pragmatic and ethical grounds for rejecting the Expert-Judgment
Strategy. Instead we ought to follow at least two mandates of risk
management, both consistent with the negotiated settlement in the
Hudson-River case. As an alternative to completely rejecting lay
perceptions of risk, we ought to (1) explicitly recognize the necessity of
free, informed consent to risk, and we ought to aim at obtaining free,
informed consent to all risks, regardless of how they are perceived or
defined and (2) negotiate so as to provide full compensation for all
risk-bearing and for all risk imposition. That is, we ought to provide
compensation consistent with potential victims' perceived hazards, not
merely compensation dictated by following the Expert-Judgment
Strategy.
Guaranteeing Consent
Regarding consent to risk, we ought to recognize that, apart from
how experts define hazards, their imposition is ethically justifiable only
if the persons affected by them have given free, informed consent. But
if this is so, then the obvious analogue for hazard evaluation and
management is medical ethics; a physician is ethically justified in
imposing a possibly nontherapeutic risk on a patient only after she or
her representative has given free, informed consent to the imposition.
Even if the patient is no expert and has faulty risk perceptions, she
retains the right to consent to the risk. The doctor cannot make that
15 E. Peelle, The MRS Task Force: Economic and Non-Economic Incentives...,
(unpublished manuscript based on lecture given at Waste Management '87 Conference
held Mar. 4, 1987 at the University of Arizona); see also note 18, infra and
Andrews, supra note 10, at 85.
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decision for her. 19
The pragmatic justification for recognizing the ethical requirements
of free, informed consent, and then negotiating regarding compensating
persons for consenting to higher risks, is that such recognition defuses
opposition about the level of the risk imposed and about the justification
for it. It helps resolve conflict about perceived risk, controversy that is
often generated by employing the Expert-Judgment Strategy. Such
opposition is defused because the necessity of providing a "risk
package" (including compensation and risk-mitigation agreements), to
which potential victims will give consent, drives both proponents and
opponents to work toward a negotiated agreement. Admittedly,
opponents of taking a particular technological risk may view this
negotiated consent as a way to coopt them, and proponents of taking the
risk may see it as an expensive way to buy agreement. Nevertheless,
there are both ethical and pragmatic grounds for attempting to negotiate
consent. 2 0 Not to pursue an agreement is to be forced either into
curtailing technological progress or into a situation in which someone,
other than all those affected, makes risk evaluations and decides risk
policies.
19 Examples of important essays on risk and consent are included in VALUES AT
RISK, supra note 10; Cox & Ricci, supra note 10, at 1017; and in HAZARDS:
TECHNOLOGY AND FAIRNESS (R.Kates, A. Weinberg et al. eds. 1986). Examples of
classic essays on informed consent and medical experimentation include Jonas,
Philosophical Reflections on Experimenting with Human Subjects, Curran, The
Tuskegee Syphilis Study and Barber, The Ethics of Experimentation, all in MORAL
CHOICES (P. Rieff & I. Finkle eds. 1977). See also Freund, Ethical Problems in
Human Experimentation, Beecher, Ethics and Clinical Research and Havighurst,
Compensating Persons Injured in Human Experimentation, all in READINGS ON
ETICAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES IN BIOMEDICAL ENGINEERING 16 (R. Wertz ed. 1973).
20 See also, supra note 17; E. Peelle, Hazardous Waste Outlook (unpublished
manuscript for TVA and U.S. DOE, contract No. DE-AC05-840R21400); Peelle,
Carnes et al., Incentives and Nuclear Waste Siting 7 ENERGY SYS. AND POLY. 323
(1983).
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Guaranteeing Compensation
Regarding compensation for risk, we ought to recognize that, apart
from how experts define a particular risk, its imposition is ethically
justifiable only if the persons affected by the hazard are compensated for
the danger they face. Moreover, the compensation must be
commensurate with the potential victims' perception of the hazard, not
merely with an expert's judgment. The justification for requiring
compensation includes both due process and equal protection notions
from our ethical/legal traditions. Equal protection requires, at a
minimum, that when society sanctions placing some persons at higher
risks than others, those disadvantaged deserve compensation.
Moreover, if some persons bear a risk associated with benefits received
by others not bearing the risk, e.g., by living near a toxic waste dump,
equity demands that those facing the greater danger have the right to
compensation. 21
The pragmatic grounds for compensation are closely related to
contemporary and neoclassical economic theory. These are: (1) that
contemporary benefit-cost analysis presupposes that the gainers
compensate the losers, if a transaction is to be economically efficient.
The compensation rule simply moves the concept of "money changing
hands" from the level of economic theory to that of practical dispute
resolution; (2) that compensation for those facing special technology-
related hazards is consistent with current market mechanisms for
compensating those who bear risks, e.g., those endangered by noise
because they live near airports; and (3) that risk compensation for those
living near a waste facility, for example, is also consistent with the
economic theory of the compensating wage differential. On that theory,
imposition of a higher workplace risk is justified, in part, if those
21 For arguments to this effect, see J. THOMSON, RIGHTS, RESTITUTION AND RISK
(1986). See also Carnes et al., Incentives in Nuclear Waste Siting in RESOLVING
LOCAL CoNFLICT 354 (R. Lake ed. 1987). See also O'-Iare, Not on My Block You
Don't, 25 PUBLIC POL1Y. 407 (1977).
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bearing the additional risk give free, informed consent to the risk, and if
they receive higher wages proportional to the hazards they face. 2
Admittedly, it may be the case that the ethical and social costs
associated with risks like those from hazardous waste facilities are not
compensable. 2 3 If they are, then compensation is pragmatically
desirable because it addresses equity problems and is likely to help
eliminate opposition to the facilities and resolve conflict.24 If the risks
posed by threats like hazardous waste facilities are not compensable,
the n society must decide whether they are avoidable. If they are
avoidable, and not "necessary risks,"2 5 then well and good: society can
forego the benefits obtained through such hazards. If the risks are not
avoidable and not compensable, then society must develop an equitable
scheme for distributing the risk; at least part of such an equitable scheme
is likely to involve some form of compensation, since society sanctions
the imposition of harm, and the harm is unavoidable. 26
22 For discussion of compensation for risks, see Part 2 of HAZARDS: TECHNOLOGY
AND FAIRNESS (R. Kates, A. Weinberg et al. eds. 1986). See K. S. SHRADER-
FRECHETrE, supra note 10, at Chapter 4, for a discussion of the compensating wage
differential. See also K. S. SHRADER-FRECHETTE, SCIENCE POLICY, ETHICS AND
ECONOMIC MNI~moDOLOGY (1984), for discussion of benefit-cost analysis and its
application to environmental policy making.
23 See Bacow & Milkey, Overcoming Local Opposition in RESOLVING LOCAL
CONFLICT, supra note 21 at 164.
24 id
25 See Samuels, The Arrogance of Intellectual Power in PHENOTYPIC VARIATION
IN POPULATIONS 118 (A. Woodhead, M. Bender & R. Leonard eds. 1988) for
discussion of "necessary risks".
26 For further discussion of risk compensation, see Cox & Ricci, supra note 10,
at 1017-1046; S. CARNES, ET AL., INCENTIVES AND THE SITiNG OF RADIOACTIV
WASTE FACILITIES, (Oak Ridge National Laboratories, ORNL/5880, 1982);
Kunreuther et al., A Decision-Process Perspective on Risk and Policy Analysis in
RESOLVING LOCAL CONFLICT, supra note 21, at 260, 270; R. MCMAHON 13T AL.,
USING COMPENSATION AND INCENTIVES WHEN SITING HAZARDOUS WASTE
MANAGEMENT FACILmES (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, SW 942, 1981);
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Removing Liability Limits
Along with compensating those affected by technological risks,
there are also ethical and pragmatic grounds for not limiting liability, in
the event of a catastrophic technological accident. The case of nuclear
power provides a good example of how the energy controversy is fueled
by the Price-Anderson Act, the current nuclear liability statute. As
mentioned earlier, this law limits the liability of nuclear power plant
owners to $640 million, with the consequence that many victims of a
possible catastrophic accident might not be compensated for all their
health costs and property losses. Since the U.S. Brookhaven Report
estimated that property damages alone, typically only about one-fourth
of total accident costs, could go as high as $17 billion for a catastrophic
fission accident, this means that nuclear utilities are liable for only about
one percent of total possible losses, in the event of a catastrophe. 2 7
Even the $17 billion figure may be too low, when one realizes that
Chernobyl, which caused few immediate fatalities, will cost about $10
billion to cleanup. 28
If such damage figures are accurate, then (apart from due process
and equal protection arguments) there are strong pragmatic grounds for
risk managers to rid policy of the nuclear "insurance asymmetry." This
asymmetry consists of the fact that, although laypeople can be insured
against plane crashes, surgeon malpractice, and a whole host of
technology-related dangers, their homeowners' policies have exclusion
O'are & Sanderson, Fair Compensation and the Boomtown Problem in RESOLVING
LOCAL CONFLCT. supra, at 376 (R. Lake ed. 1987) and H. Raiffa, THE ART OF
SCIENCE AND NEGOTIATION (1982); G. ROCHUN, THE ROLE OF PARTICIPATORY
IMPACt ASSESSMENT IN RADIOACTVE WASTE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM Acnvrrms
(Institute of Governmental Studies Report No. IGS/RW-002, University of
California, Berkeley 1980); Sandman, Getting to Maybe in REsOLVING LOCAL
CoNIcT, supra, at 333.
27 K. S. SHRADER-BRECH1ETI, NUCLEAR POWER AND PUBLIC POLICY 78 (1983).
28 Silberman, Risky Business: Congress Debates Nuclear Insurance, Not Man
Apart, May-June 1987, at 1.
I RISK-Issues in Health & Sfety 341 [Fall 1990]
clauses governing harms caused by atomic energy. All such risk
asymmetries need to be removed. If public officials expect laypeople to
believe them, when they say that something is safe, then they ought to
act as if it were safe, and provide full liability. After all, there would be
no danger in guaranteeing full coverage, if indeed the likelihood of a
catastrophe were quite small. The public reasons: Only if such
probabilities are not low is there a basis for the government not to
require full liability for all societally imposed risks.29
There is another pragmatic argument for negotiating consent and
compensation, as a procedural alternative to accepting the Expert-
Judgment Strategy. This is that, if proponents of risky technologies are
interested in winning acceptance for their point of view, then they ought
to leave no obvious targets for their opponents to attack. Otherwise
public controversy over safety will never cease. Some of the obvious
targets in the contemporary risk debate include policy makers'
tendencies to give uncritical acceptance to expert definitions of risk; to
support risk imposition before negotiating consent and compensation
agreements with those likely to be affected by the hazard; and to
sanction government-imposed liability limits for some of the accidents
most feared by the public.
If one wants to win acceptance for a risky technology, then it ought
to be assessed, evaluated, implemented, and managed in as
uncontroversial a way as possible. Welfare economists discovered an
analogous insight several decades ago. Seeking to win support for the
controversial conclusions of their benefit-cost analyses, they realized
that they needed to avoid any questionable assumptions that were not
essential to their method, e.g., the assumption that the value of a human
life can be measured by discounted future earnings. Just as techniques
like discounted future earnings jeopardize the success and acceptance of
29 Shrader-Frechette, supra note 27, at 73.
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benefit-cost analysis, so also assumptions like the Expert-Judgment
Strategy jeopardize the success and acceptance of important, but risky,
technologies.
Conclusion
If any single lesson can be learned from the arguments of this essay,
it is that experts do not always know best. This is particularly the case if
the problem at issue, distinguishing from risk perceptions is not wholly
amenable to theoretical resolution. Like successful adjudication of the
Hudson-River controversy, adjudicating conflicts over hazard
evaluation often requires that we supplement the theoretical task of
defining the risk problem in some purely scientific way. Yet, we need
also to focus on the practical task of negotiating its resolution in a
procedural way.
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